Flight testing of an augmented separation management system providing separation protection during failure of the central communication network by Fan, Sean & Ford, Jason
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
This is the accepted version of the following conference paper: 
Fan, Jiezhen S. & Ford, Jason J. (2011) Flight testing of an augmented 
separation management system providing separation protection 
during failure of the central communication network. In: 14th 
Australian International Aerospace Congress : Building on History for 
the Future, 28 February ‐ 3 March 2011, Melbourne, Australia. 
© Copyright 2011 Please consult the authors. 
AIAC14 Fourteenth Australian International Aerospace Congress
14
th 
Australian Aeronautical Conference
(*AIAC14-AERO)
Flight Testing of an Augmented Separation Management 
System Providing Separation Protection during Failure of 
the Central Communication Network
Sean Jiezhen Fan
1
and Jason Ford
1
1
Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation, Queensland University of 
Technology, 2 George St, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, Australia 4000
Abstract
Future air traffic management concepts often involve the proposal of automated separation 
management algorithms that replaces human air traffic controllers. This paper proposes a new 
type of automated separation management algorithm (based on the satisficing approach [1]) 
that utilizes inter-aircraft communication and a track file manager (or bank of Kalman filters) 
that is capable of resolving conflicts during periods of communication failure. The proposed 
separation management algorithm is tested in a range of flight scenarios involving during 
periods of communication failure, in both simulation and flight test (flight tests were 
conducted as part of the Smart Skies project [2]). The intention of the conducted flight tests 
was to investigate the benefits of using inter-aircraft communication to provide an extra layer 
of safety protection in support air traffic management during periods of failure of the 
communication network. These benefits were confirmed. 
Keywords: Separation management, satisficing game theory, inter-aircraft communication.
1. Introduction
Air traffic management has faced significant traffic growth over the past decade. Future ATM 
systems will need to handle this  growth in increased demand, while at the same time, 
maintain or even improve the level of safety [3]. In these future ATM systems, 
communication links are vital components  because they allow for information sharing, 
situation awareness and air traffic separation management commands to be issued. Previously, 
it has been observed that in order to enhance the safety, efficiency and capacity, next 
generation air traffic management algorithms will need to be robust against communication 
issues [4, 5]. In earlier work, we examined the benefits of switching between centralised and 
decentralised separation management algorithms [5]. In this paper we will examine the 
benefits of inter-aircraft communication.
There are two main ways to maintain situation awareness during the event of communication 
failure. In the first type of approach, using the prediction capabilities of filters, an on-board 
air-traffic picture can be maintained using a track file manager that predicts future air-traffic 
location information on the basis of previously received aircraft location information. 
However, the key drawback of this approach is that the error in predicted aircraft position 
tends to grow as time elapses following the communication failure event. In the second type 
of approach, new information is used to update air traffic picture (information that can be 
gaining through additional on-board sensors or via information shared over inter-aircraft 
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communication links). One example of this second type of approach is the additional 
information that is provided by the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) 
system; ADS-B is a cooperative surveillance technique for air traffic control in which an 
ADS-B-equipped aircraft determines its own position using a global navigation satellite 
system and periodically broadcasts this position and other relevant information to potential 
ground stations and other aircraft with ADS-B-in equipment. In alternative situations, extra or 
new air traffic information might be requested via inter-platform communication (link2000+, 
a European pioneer air traffic management); other possible resources of traffic information 
includes on-board Radar or EO sensors. 
The range of possible communication systems currently available suggest that in the near 
future it may be routine to request critical information from nearby aircraft through suitable
peer-to-peer communication links, and that this new information will be used in support of air 
traffic separation during any periods of failure in the centralised communication network. In 
this paper we propose the use of a safety augmentation system containing a decentralised 
separation management system involving a track file manager, an on-board conflict detection 
system, and a separation manager based on a modified satisficing approach. The proposed 
system will provide separation support during a period of central communication network 
failure (by switching to a safe decentralised mode of operation that offers separation 
protection through the use of inter-aircraft communication). 
2. Separation Management System Overview
Safety in air traffic operations is generally understood to involve the five layers of safety 
processes and systems that are shown in Figure 1 [6] . These five layers provide multiple 
levels of collision protection and, as such, each of these layers would have to fail in order for 
a mid-air collision to occur. This layered approach starts in Layer 1 which contains the basic 
procedures and structure of airspace management (aspects such as predefined operational 
altitudes and predefined flight routes) that provides the basic framework for air-traffic 
operation. In the 2
nd
and 3
rd
layers a centrally located air traffic management system (human 
operators and ground-based radar systems) performs aircraft traffic separation management. 
Layers 4 and 5 related to emergency safety systems that are beyond the scope of this study.
This paper is specifically focused on  (automated) separation management (in the 2
nd
and 3
rd
layers) which is the task of maintaining safe separation distances between aircraft and, in the 
event of a potential conflict arising, this system also has the task of resolving conflicts in a 
safe manner. 
However if a communication failure event occurs (such as the failure of receiver or 
transmitter hardware or a failure of the ground based radar system), then there is a possibility 
that a centralised ATM system might incorrectly handle the information available, and that
this incorrect response might lead into a mid-air collision. 
For these reasons, we will examine the separation management problem in an environment 
involving possible periods of communication failure. That is, the systems we investigated 
must operate in two environments:
AIAC14 Fourteenth Australian International Aerospace Congress
14
th 
Australian Aeronautical Conference
(*AIAC14-AERO)
● A normal operating environment; and
● A communication failure operating environment.
Fig. 1: Safety in air traffic operations
Normal Operating Environment
In a normal operating environment, the central information network is assume to be presented 
and functional in the sense that it allows separation commands to be transmitted to all air-
traffic. For our purposes here, we will assume that air-traffic picture used for centralised 
separation management is perfect; that is all aircraft information is known by the centralized 
separation manager. We will also assume that ideal communication with aircraft occurs which 
means neither delay/loss packets nor noise is introduced into the problem.
Communication Failure Operating Environment
In a communication failure operating environment, the central information network is 
assumed to have lost connection with all aircraft; in this case, we assume all aircraft operate
without any situation awareness information being provided by the central ATM system. We 
will assume that inter-aircraft communication exists.
2.1 Overview of our proposed separation management system
An overview of the separation management system is provided in Figure 2.
The propose on-board decentralized separation management system involves a) track file 
manager, b) request/response system c) a conflict detection system, and d) a separation 
manager as shown in Figure 3. We now separately describe each of the components:
1) Track file manager
The track file manager involves a bank of Kalman filters but also involves algorithms that 
perform data association, track initialisation and track termination processing. At the core of 
the track file manager there is one Kalman filter for each aircraft in the airspace. The state of 
each Kalman filter describes the position and velocity vector of the aircraft. The track file 
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manager operates in both normal and failure environments. In particular, the track file
manager operates during the normal communication environment so that a current picture of 
air-traffic is available if the centralised communication network ever fails.
Figure 2: Separation Management System Overview
Fig. 3: On-board Decision Systemcontains 4 main modules: a request/response system to 
manage communication with central ATM or manage inter-aircraft communication, a track 
file manager to maintain local situational awareness, a conflict detection system, and a 
decentralized separation manager to determine suitable separation actions, when required.
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2) Request/response system. 
This module of the system manages communication with central air traffic manager and inter-
aircraft communication. For inter-aircraft communication purpose, the communication 
protocol contains a request message (that requests a position update from nearby aircraft) and 
response message. This system operates in both normal and failure environments.
3) Conflict detection system. 
The function of this module is to evaluate the air-traffic map, as described by the Kalman 
filter bank; to determine if a potential conflict exists between this aircraft and any other 
aircraft in the region. This system operates only in the failure environment.
4) Separation manager. 
The function of the separation management module is to determine suitable separation 
commands to resolve any conflicts identified by the on-board conflict detection system. In 
this  research, the satisficing game theory (Archibald et al) is the centralized multi-agent 
approach used to resolve aircraft conflicts (but other separation algorithms might also be 
considered). This system operates only in the failure environment.
3. Simulation Study
We simulated the separation management system discussed above to evaluate its performance 
in different scenarios. The dynamics of each simulated aircraft were represented using 
sophisticated six degree of freedom C172 aircraft simulator developed in the University of 
Sheffield. All aircraft have a constant speed of 100 knots. Evaluation of the separation 
management system will be based on the minimum separation distance achieved during the 
simulation.
Figure 4shows the two scenario types that were examined in this study: one turn into crossing 
conflict, and double turns into crossing conflict. These two encounters are topological 
equivalent to a range of encounters between two-aircraft (involving different approach angles).  
The angle of approach in the encounter does not significantly impact the issues considered in 
this paper.
One turn into crossing 
conflict
Double turns into crossing 
conflict
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3.1 Simulation Results
This section describes the results of our simulation studies which compare the two different 
traffic pattern scenarios identified above. For each of the traffic pattern scenario, algorithms 
were examined in the two operational modes: normal operating environment and failure
operating environment. In each operational mode, for each traffic scenario, we compared a 
pure centralised approach with the new proposed system both with and without access to 
inter-aircraft communication.
In these simulations, all aircraft are assumed to have initial communication with central 
information network, and it was assumed that central information network failure occurs just 
before the aircraft turns commence. During the failure period, all aircraft traffic information is 
propagated in track file managers on-board each aircraft. This on-board air-traffic picture is 
used for conflict detection. When inter-aircraft communication is available, any information 
communicated to an aircraft is used in its on-board track file managers, and hence impacts on 
conflict detections and separation management commands that this aircraft generates. 
Table 1 shows the separation distance achieved (during normal communication network 
operation) by the original centralised separation management and a pure decentralised
separation management approach.
Table 2 shows the separation distances achieved (during communication network failure) by 
the new proposed approach with/without inter-aircraft communication (separation is deemed 
to have been maintained if separation distance is kept greater than 1500m).
Table 1: Normal Operating Environment Performance
Cases for Normal Operating 
Environment
One 
Turn
One Turn 
Case 2
Double 
Turn
Double Turn 
Case 2
Pure centralized 2632m 2144m 1752m 1832m
Pure decentralized 4551m 4423m 3383m 3462m
Table 2: Failure Operating Environment Performance
Cases for Failure Operating 
Environment
One 
Turn
One Turn 
Case 2
Double 
Turn
Double Turn 
Case 2
Without inter-aircraft communication 2777m 3017m 42m 58m
With inter-aircraft communication 3683m 3815m 3453m 3312m
Fig. 4: Simulation Scenarios. These two scenarios represent the 
two simplest scenarios under which a two-aircraft conflict can 
arise during communication failure. 
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The results given in Table 1 show that the decentralized separation management system 
achieved separation distances significantly larger than required minimum separation distances, 
corresponding to large heading deviations from original trajectory (these large deviations are 
undesirable). These large deviations suggest that a pure decentralised approach is not 
desirable.
The results given in Table 2 suggest that, in two aircraft scenario, the aircraft will be able to 
resolve potential conflicts even during communication network failure with the help of 
decentralized separation management on the basis of propagated traffic information (without 
the need for new information), as long as only one aircraft changes their course after network 
failure. However if both aircraft change their course during the period of communication 
blackout then it is possible for conflict to occur if  no additional  information is obtained from 
inter-aircraft communication. However, successful separation could be achieved in the double 
turn case (even during communication failure) if additional information was provided by 
inter-aircraft communication.
4. Flight Test
We also examined the proposed separation management system in flight tests. Our 
development environment allows both high fidelity simulation testing (6DOF dynamic 
models) and flight testing of proposed algorithms, and includes:
● Three computers hosting parts of the separation management system that is 
implemented in a hybrid Matlab®/C++ framework.
● Specialized communication layers to manage air-traffic communication (both software 
protocol interfaces and hardware). Communication occurred over 3.5G mobile 
telephone data networks.
● Specialized automated separation management approaches (based on satisficing 
approach).
● Specialized 6DOF simulation models for virtual aircraft (conforming to interfacing 
requirements).
● [Optional] a Cessna 172R aircraft (equipped with specialized avionics such as high-
grade IMUs and various data connections).
The relationship between the components in this architecture is shown in the Figure 5. We 
highlight that communication layer and other aspects of this architecture were developed as 
part of the Smart Skies Project.
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Fig. 5: Overall System Architecture: Flight tests were conducted in Burrandowan area (near 
Brisbane).  Central communication network was provided by mobile data network. This 
network connected the separation manager (in Brisbane) with aircraft in the flight test area 
(distance between two locations >100km).  Simulated aircraft were also involved in the flight 
test. 
The primary advantage of the developed architecture is that it allows us to first perform rapid 
algorithm developments in a user-friendly simulation environment. Once verified in 
simulation, we can the easily transition to actual flight testing (because our architecture works
with both simulated hardware and actual hardware).
The primary purpose of this flight tests was to provide preliminary verification of our new 
safety augmentation separation system. A secondary purpose was to evaluate how well our 
simulation models (primarily our 6DOF) match the real interactions that occur during real 
conflict resolution. One aircraft was our specially equipped Cessna 172R aircraft. The other 
aircraft in the conflict engagement was a computer simulation of an aircraft (that mimicked all 
the required interfaces, the aerodynamic behaviour and the response to separation 
instructions). 
4.1 Flight Test Results
Table 3 shows the test results obtained through flight test which involving one real aircraft 
and one simulated aircraft. Note that the flight test cases marked with “X” were not performed 
due to the technical issues.
Table 3: Flight Test Separation Management Performance
Cases One 
Turn
One Turn 
Case 2
Double 
Turn
Double Turn 
Case 2
Normal Operation
Pure centralized 2574m 2419m 1531m 1916m
Pure decentralized 3715m 3470m 3764m 3613m
Failure Environment Operation
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Without inter-aircraft communication X X X X
With inter-aircraft communication X X X 2640m
2.642 2.643 2.644 2.645 2.646 2.647 2.648 2.649
-0.465
-0.464
-0.463
-0.462
-0.461
-0.46
-0.459
-0.458
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Fig. 6: The resolved flight test trajectories in the double turn into crossing conflict scenario
(Real flight test). The real aircraft is denoted in red (starting from the lower right of its shown 
trajectory) and the simulated aircraft is denoted in blue (starting from the top left of its shown 
trajectory). At lower right, some of the red (real) aircraft’s trajectory prior to the experiment 
is shown (and should be ignored).  
We will now describe some of the data collected for double turn case in a failure environment 
operation, with access to inter-aircraft communication. Figure 6 shows the trajectories 
followed by the aircraft during this scenario. The red trajectory corresponds to the real aircraft 
and the blue trajectory corresponds to the simulated aircraft. We highlight that in this scenario
the central information network failed just before aircraft commenced their turns; therefore 
neither aircraft was aware of the potential conflict until they were able to update their local air
traffic map using information received via inter-aircraft communication. In this situation with 
inter-aircraft communication, the conflict is detected and resolved once the traffic map has 
been updated in both of the decentralized separation management systems on each aircraft. 
Once the potential conflict has been resolved, both aircraft return to flight towards their 
original waypoints.
In Figure 7 we shows the trigged message from decentralized separation management and 
response behaviour of the 6DOF aircraft (the blue line), the red line corresponds to the time 
instant in the conflict has been detected and the decentralized separation management starts 
issuing  separation instructions to the real aircraft. The instructions  were issued at 217 
seconds into the flight test.  20 seconds after the trigged message, the aircraft achieves it 
separation instruction designed to avoid the detected collision. We highlight that during the 
flight test, a minimum separation distance of 2640m was achieved and we highlight that there 
is no significant difference between the performance of the simulation tests and the flight tests.
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Fig. 7: The 6DOF aircraft actual heading is shown in blue, the vertical line denotes the time
that a conflict was detected, separation instruction were issued to the aircraft that cause the 
aircraft to turn to a heading of -0.6 Rad.
In summary, this flight test provided a preliminary validation of the new automated separation 
management concepts. Since there is no significant different performance observed between 
simulation and flight test, no further flight tests related to this experiment were conducted.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we have propose a new safety augmentation system using a decentralised 
separation management system that involves a track file manager, an on-board conflict 
detection system, and a separation manager based on a modified satisficing approach. Our 
simulation and flight tests showed that with the help of inter-aircraft communication, our
proposed separation management system was able to resolve potential conflict during a period 
of central communication failure. 
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